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NOTES
GOOD FAITH RELIANCE UPON FEDERAL
RESERVE BOARD STAFF OPINION LETTERS:
THE CIRCUITS CONVERGE
I. Introduction
The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) administers the Truth in
Lending Act (Act)I pursuant to Title I of the Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act.' Congress intended this legislation to effect an
"informed use of credit."' It empowered the FRB to "prescribe regu-
lations"; to make "classifications, differentiations, or other provi-
sions"; and to provide any "adjustments and exceptions" it deemed
"necessary or proper."4 This vague and discretionary mandate effec-
tively made the FRB the "central single agency for issuing all regu-
lations on credit disclosures." 5
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-65 (1970)[hereinafter cited as Act]. The FRB is not the sole admin-
istrator of the Act. Its jurisdiction is restricted to member state banks. Id. § 1607 (Supp. V,
1975). The following agencies are also responsible for supervision of the Act: the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation for insured state banks which are non-federal reserve; the
Comptroller of the Currency for national banks; the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions for
federal credit unions; the Federal Home Loan Bank Board through the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation, or directly with respect to any institution subject to sections
1426(1), 1437, 1464(d) and 1730 of Title 12; the Civil Aeronautics Board for air carriers under
its jurisdiction; and the Agriculture Department for certain creditors under the Packers and
Stockyard Act. Id. The overall enforcing agency for any of these various departments is the
Federal Trade Commission. Id. § 1607(c).
2. Id. §§1601-65 (1970). Consumer advocates had tried for years to pass truth-in-lending
legislation. Senator Paul Douglas first introduced a credit disclosure bill in 1959. He at-
tempted every year thereafter to garner support for some such version of it until his defeat in
a reelection bid in 1966. Senator William Proxmire then took up the cause, successfully
piloting the Consumer Credit Protection Act through Congress in 1968. M. NADEL, THE
POLITICS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 130-37 (1971).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V, 1975). Congress determined that to enhance "economic
stabilization" and "competition among the various financial institutions" it should
strengthen the informed use of credit. Therefore, it attempted "to assure a meaningful disclo-
sure of credit terms" so that the consumer might avoid the "uninformed use of credit." Id.
4. Id. § 1604 (1970).
5. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1967). In this report the following lan-
guage appears:
All substantive regulations in connection with the full disclosure of the terms and
conditions of finance charges in credit transactions . . . shall be issued by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. No one can deny their experience and
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Congress wanted the FRB to consolidate all disclosure require-
ments.' It did so, but in a confusing fashion, utilizing three different
methods to disseminate truth-in-lending information. First, it pub-
lished an administrative code, Regulation Z,7 to prescribe disclosure
rules. Second, it supplemented the code with interpretations' of the
rules in an effort to educate the public. Third, it delegated to staff
attorneys the ministerial task of replying to public inquiries about
the Act.' Confusion resulted when the regulations, interpretations,
and staff letters disagreed on the applicable law. 0
These inconsistencies have perplexed the federal courts. As a re-
sult, the circuits recognize different sources as the legitimate voice
of the FRB. For example, the Second and Fifth Circuits give legal
effect to only specific provisions of Regulation Z, while the Ninth
Circuit lends credence to staff opinion letters as well." This Note
will explore these differences, and discuss the probable impact of a
1976 amendment to the Act.
II. Evolution of the Problem
In empowering the FRB to administer the Act with discretion,
Congress failed to place any statutory limitations on the Board's
authority.'2 As a result, the FRB required stricter disclosure than
the Act itself,3 thereby exceeding the intentions of Congress.
expertise in these matters. Accordingly, . . . for uniformity of application to all af-
fected segments of the industries concerned, a single set of comprehensive regulations
should be issued.
Id. at 18.
6. Id.; see, e.g., Mason v. General Fin. Corp., 542 F.2d 1226, 1231 (4th Cir. 1976).
7. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.14 (1976).
8. These interpretations immediately follow the provisions of Regulation Z at 12 C.F.R.
§§ 226.101-.1001 (1976).
9. The FRB's authority to delegate these correspondence writing duties presently derives
from 41 Fed. Reg. 28,255-56 (1976)(to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(4)).
10. See, e.g., Herbst v. First Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n, 538 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1976)
(uncertainties and inconsistencies of FRB staff opinions); Williams v. Bill Watson Ford, Inc.,
423 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. La. 1976)(uncertainties over the definition of a "charge" under the
Act and Regulation Z). See also cases cited in note 11 infra.
11. See Martin v. Commercial Secs. Co., 539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976); Pollock v. General
Fin. Corp., 535 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1976); Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975);
Bone v. Hibernia Bank, 493 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1974).
12. See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
13. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Allen v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 531 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3275 (U.S. Oct.
12, 1976)(No. 76-182).
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The United States Supreme Court addressed the scope of FRB
authority in Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc. ,4 In that
case a FRB regulation required the lender to disclose all charges in
connection with any contract providing for payment in more than
four installments.' But section 121 of the Act merely required dis-
closure if a lender offered to finance for a charge."6 In sustaining the
more stringent provision, the Court described it as "reasonably re-
lated to the purposes of the enabling legislation."'" Eight justices,"
in deference to the FRB's experience and resources, 9 convincingly
bestowed great authority upon the Board. Thus, the Court permit-
ted the FRB to supplement with regulations those parts of the Act
under its jurisdiction.
Mourning resolved the legitimacy of Regulation Z, but never ex-
pressly decided whether the FRB could interpret that regulation,
write staff opinion letters,20 or publish pamphlets en masse in' fur-
therance of its statutory mandate to ensure an "informed use of
credit."'" Because the United States Supreme Court has not since
addressed the scope of FRB authority,22 conflicting theories prevail
14. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 362-63; 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1970).
17. 411 U.S. at 369. The Court cites Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969),
as authority for the concept that federal agencies need only satisfy a test of reason in adminis-
tration of their duties. In that case a tenant was evicted for being head of a tenant's group.
The landlord, however, did not inform the tenant of the reasons for his eviction as required
by a circular authored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Court
upheld the validity of the circular pronouncing the aforementioned reasonableness test. Id.
at 280-81.
18. Mourning was a five to four decision. However, only Justice Powell truly dissented.
Justices Douglas, Rehnquist and Stewart agreed with the majority on the law, but they
wanted the case remanded to settle a question of fact. 411 U.S. at 378-88.
19. The Court noted that "Congress determined to lay the structure of the Act broadly
and to entrust its construction to an agency with the necessary experience and resources to
monitor its operation." 411 U.S. at 365. Moreover, the Court underscored the congressional
desire to ensure the FRB enough discretionary power to cope with willing evaders of the Act.
Id.
20. However, an argument could be posited that Mourning accepted the validity of FRB
letters sub silencio. The Court did refer to an advisory letter which Vice Chairman Robertson
had written. Id. at 368-69. Nonetheless, there was no such express holding to that effect.
21. See note 3 supra.
22. Mourning was recently mentioned in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). That
case involved the denial of social security benefits to a widow. The Court referred to the
"latitude" given legislative decisions that concern the private area of the law. Id. at 774. This
was an obvious allusion to the sweeping powers that Congress granted the FRB.
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concerning Mourning's effect on these other sources of truth-in-
lending information.
One school of thought believes the FRB has authority to utilize
means other than Regulation Z in administering the Act, since both
Congress and the Court essentially rendered it autonomous." Others
seem to rely upon Mourning's strict holding which legitimated Reg-
ulation Z alone.24 The circuits reflect both rationales. 25
Amendments to the Act have largely obviated the controversy. In
1974 Congress passed an amendment which validated FRB interpre-
tations of Regulation Z.2 In 1976 Congress again amended the stat-
ute to legitimate official staff letters." Because the federal courts
have not as yet construed this new amendment, 2 an analysis of the
past confusion among the circuits is essential to a complete under-
standing of its probable effect.
III. Conflict Among the Circuits
A. FRB Methods To Disseminate Information:
Interpretations, Staff Letters, and Pamphlets
On July 10, 1976 the FRB amended section 226.1 of Regulation Z
to set out the various methods of procuring reliable truth-in-lending
information. 2 Previously no such reliable regulatory guideline ex-
isted. Instead, the prospective creditor depended upon either FRB
interpretations, staff letters, or pamphlets0 which did not necessar-
23. See, e.g., Bone v. Hibernia Bank, 493 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1974); St. Germain v. Bank
of Hawaii, 413 F. Supp. 587 (D. Haw. 1976).
24. See, e.g., Martin v. Commercial Secs. Co., 539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976); Ives v. W. T.
Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975); see generally Johnson v. Associates Fin., Inc., 369 F.
Supp. 1121 (S.D. Ill. 1974) and Stefanski v. Mainway Budget Plan, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 138
(S.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 456 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1972) wherein both courts
utilized the Mourning rationale without citation to the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion. Stefanshi was decided prior to Mourning.
25. See notes 23-24 supra.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f) (Supp. V, 1975).
27. Act of February 27, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3(b), 90 Stat. 197 (to be codified in
15 U.S.C. § 1640(f)).
28. One such federal district court expressly declined to pass on the question in light of
the new amendment. See Lewis v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 416 F. Supp. 514, 517-18
(D.D.C. 1976).
29. 41 Fed. Reg. 28,255-56 (1976) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.1); see note 106 infra.
30. One can readily appreciate how a creditor might be misled into believing that What
You Ought to Know About Truth in Lending was the official FRB interpretation of the law.
The pamphlet contains the following language:
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ily carry the stamp of full FRB approval.
The FRB issued formal interpretations to clear up any confusion
resulting from the more equivocal sections of Regulation Z.:11 At
least one FRB administrator considered them as authoritative as
the regulation itself.32 Others suggested that "[slince the Board
wrote Regulation Z, it [was] obviously best able to interpret provi-
sions found there."33 Nonetheless, the FRB did not always support
these views. For example, FRB officials have occasionally character-
ized these interpretations as non-substantive in order to avoid the
public notice requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. 4
This ambivalence within the FRB raised doubts about whether such
interpretations were binding as law.
Staff attorneys wrote both official and unofficial opinion letters
in response to factual problems which creditors presented. :" They
assigned FRB numbers to the official correspondence and distrib-
uted such correspondence as Public Position Letters in order to
resolve issues of general public concern." In contrast, the staff de-
signed the unofficial correspondence to meet the needs of the indi-
vidual inquirer. 7 In the FRB's view, 8 this distinction did not change
If you extend consumer credit, then you must become familiar with Regulation Z on
Truth in Lending. You will be responsible, as a creditor, for complying with the Regu-
lation.
This pamphlet tells you how Regulation Z affects your business. It tells you what you
must let your customer know when you offer or extend them consumer credit-including
agricultural and real estate credit.
The pamphlet then includes the text of the Act and the Regulation, questions and answers
about truth-in-lending, and sample disclosure forms. A footnote on the cover page informs
the reader that the material in the pamphlet has been prepared by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
31. The present requirements for issuing an interpretation appear at 41 Fed. Reg. 28,256
(1976) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(4)(i)).
32. See, e.g., the March 22, 1972 statement of Vice Chairman Robertson before the Sub-
committee on Consumer Affairs of the House Banking and Currency Committee. CLONTZ,
TRUTH IN LENDING MANUAL §§ 1-13 to 1-22 (3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as CLONTZI.
33. CLONTZ, supra note 32, 1.01-A[3], at 5 (1975).
34. See Continental Oil Co. v. Bums, 317 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D. Del. 1970).
35. CLONTZ, supra note 32, at 5.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Deputy Secretary Kenneth A. Kenyon said on one occasion:
[Tihe Board considers the present informal and flexible procedure, by which mem-
bers of its staff provide opinions on regulatory provisions, an essential part of its
operations. It is the Board's view that the public is entitled to rely on a formal staff
opinion unless and until it is altered by the Board after formal consideration.
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the legal effect of the correspondence. Nonetheless, the courts did
not always agree."
The FRB utilized various other methods in an effort to educate
the public. It distributed over two million copies of What You Ought
to Know About Truth in Lending, ° a pamphlet explaining the Act.
In addition, FRB staff answered questions by telephone, and period-
ically held training sessions for member bank employees." In 1974,
the FRB instituted an adult and secondary education pilot program
to further public familiarity with the Act.4" These methods of ac-
quiring truth-in-lending information were even less authoritative
than either interpretations or staff letters.
Reliance was the problem. Violation of the Act carried stringent
criminal and civil penalties." The creditor who, in good faith, relied
Excerpt from FRB letter No. 444 of Kenneth A. Kenyon, Deputy Secretary of the FRB (March
1, 1971), reprinted in Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d 971, 979 n.17 (5th Cir.
1974).
39. See, e.g., cases cited in note 24 supra.
40. See CLONTZ, supra note 32, at 1-15. The FRB also has distributed over 3.5 million
copies of a leaflet, What Truth in Lending Means to You in both Spanish and English
containing information analogous to the pamphlet. Id.; see also note 30 supra.
41. See statement of Hon. Jeffrey M. Bucher, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System before the SURCOMM. ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, CUR-
RENCY AND HOUSING, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., CONSUMER INFORMATION 33 (Comm. Print 1975)
[hereinafter cited as CONSUMER INFORMATION].
42. Annual Report to Congress on Truth in Lending For the Year 1974 on January 3, 1975,
CONSUMER INFORMATION 36.
43. See, e.g., Johnson v. Associates Fin., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121, 1123-24 (S.D. Il. 1974)
(court rejects pamphlets); accord, Scott v. Liberty Fin., Co., 380 F. Supp. 475, 480 (D. Neb.
1974).
44. The criminal penalties are found in 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970) which provides:
Whoever willfully and knowingly
(1) gives false or inaccurate information or fails to provide information which he
is required to disclose under the provisions of this subchapter or any regulation issued
thereunder,
(2) uses any chart or table authorized by the Board under section 1606 of this title
in such a manner as to consistently understate the annual percentage rate determined
under section 1606(a)(1)(A) of this title, or
(3) otherwise fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter,
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
See also 15 U.S.C. § 1614 (Supp. V, 1975) (liability of assignees). The civil penalties asso-
ciated with truth-in-lending violations are equally as stringent. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp.
V, 1975) provides:
Individual or class action for damages; amount of award; factors determining amount
of award.
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails to comply with
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upon an opinion, interpretation, or pamphlet risked punishment if
the courts refused to recognize its validity. A movement arose to
enact an exculpatory provision in the Act for such "good faith"
reliance.
B. Attempted Resolution
The statute, as originally enacted, did not exculpate from liability
one who in good faith followed the ostensibly "official" advice of a
FRB interpretation, staff letter or pamphlet. One enterprising de-
fendant sought to create such a defense, citing the Act's "bona fide"
error clause in Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.". The
any requirement imposed under this part or part D of this subchapter with respect to
any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of-
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the failure;
(2) (A) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance
charge in connection with the transaction, except that the liability under this
subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000; or
(B) in the case of a class action, such amount as the court may allow,
except that as to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall be
applicable, and the total recovery in such action shall not be more than the
lesser of $100,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the creditor; and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability the
costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by
the court.
In determining the amount of award in any class action, the court shall consider,
among other relevant factors, the amount of any actual damages awarded, the
frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor, the resources
of the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to
which the creditor's failure of compliance was intentional.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois interpreted
"intentional" to mean that "the defendant knew what it was doing and did it, although its
failure . . . was apparently negligent or a mistake of law rather than willful or wanton."
Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 71 F.R.D. 334, 337 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Therefore, misplaced reliance
upon an FRB staff letter in good faith was not a valid excuse for violation of the Act under
this section. The flagrant wrongdoer and the hapless creditor who tried to comply with the
law suffered the same penalties.
45. 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The bona ide error clause appears in 15 U.S.C. §
1640(c) (Supp. V, 1975). That section provides:
A creditor may not be held liable in any action brought under this section for a
violation of this subchapter if the creditor shows by a preponderance of evidence that
the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding
the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.
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United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
rejected his argument, concluding that Congress enacted the clause
at the behest of businessmen who feared penalties for inadvertent
errors,46 "notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures adapted
to avoid any such error." 7 Defendant's inventive statutory construc-
tion, although initially dismissed, laid the foundation for more suc-
cessful efforts in the future.
Congress amended the Act in 1974 to afford immunity similar to
that which the court had rejected in Ratner." The amendment had
a narrow scope since its "good faith" immunity clause applied only
to reliance on "any rule, regulation, or interpretation thereof by the
Board."" Congress clearly intimated that pamphlets and staff let-
ters were not within its ambit.5" The FRB itself conceded that "this
section does not extend to good faith compliance with Federal Re-
serve Board staff opinion letters."'"
The 1974 amendment left businessmen in a quandary. Because of
the amendment, it could no longer be stated with conviction that
"the public is entitled to rely on a formal staff opinion unless and
until it is altered by the Board after formal consideration.""'
46. 329 F. Supp. at 281 n.17.
47. See note 45 supra; see also Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871
(7th Cir. 1976). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals clearly suggested that the defendant
who seeks exculpation for truth-in-lending violations under the bona fide clause must do more
than demonstrate his good faith attempts at compliance. Id. at 878; accord, Hinkle v. Rock
Springs Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 295, 297 (10th Cir. 1976).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f) (Supp. V, 1975).
49. Id. The immunity provision reads as follows:
No provision of this section or section 1611 of this title imposing any liability shall
apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule, regulation,
or interpretation thereof by the Board, notwithstanding that after such act or omission
has occurred, such rule, regulation, or interpretation is amended, rescinded, or deter-
mined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.
Id.
50. See S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973). The report noted that "in order
to confer immunity from civil liability, the rule, regulation, or interpretation thereof must
be approved by the Board itself and not merely the staff of the Board. "Id. (emphasis added).
Since it is the staff which writes the correspondence, a recipient of such a letter cannot rely
upon it with impunity.
51. Collins, Current Developments in Truth in Lending and Other Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Legislation, 2 OHio No. L. REV. 477, 478 (1975).
52. Excerpt from FRB letter No. 444 of Kenneth A. Kenyon, Deputy Secretary of the FRB
(March 1, 1971), reprinted in Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d 971, 979 n.17
(5th Cir. 1974); see note 38 supra.
NOTES
These events caused a difference of opinion among the circuits
and their district courts. Some courts recognized that the 1974
amendment did not legitimate staff letters, and refused to consider
binding those staff opinions they felt were incorrect.5 Other courts
gave legal effect to all FRB opinion letters and pamphlets despite
their exclusion from the immunity clause. 4 Thus the public suffered
the unhappy circumstance of having different law govern the con-
struction of the Act in adjoining circuits.
C. Divergent Views
The Ninth Circuit has generally given legal effect to staff letters,
formal Board interpretations, and circulated pamphlets. In Bone v.
Hibernia Bank5 the court was required to determine the proper
computation method for measuring the unearned portion of a
finance charge. Regulation Z did not address the issue. But What
You Ought to Know About Truth in Lending, a Board interpreta-
tion, and a staff letter collectively prescribed a given method.5" The
court found these authorities binding, implicitly accepting and ex-
panding Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc." It adopted
Mourning's deference to the great expertise and experience of the
FRB,55 but also effectively found the judgment of staff employees
tantamount to law.59
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii re-
cently reiterated the Bone rationale in St. Germain v. Bank of
Hawaii.0 It described staff letters as the "forerunners" of formal
FRB interpretations.6 ' Speaking in terms of the vast pragmatic
53. See Jones v. Community Loan & Inv. Corp., 544 F.2d 1228, 1229 (5th Cir.1976); cf
Pennino v. Morris Kirschman & Co., 526 F.2d 367, 371 n.8 (5th Cir. 1976) (pamphlets); see
also Pedro v. Pacific Plan, 393 F. Supp. 315, 323 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (staff letters are a "valuable
tool," but not binding); Stefanski v. Mainway Budget Plan, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 138, 142 (S.D.
Fla. 1971), rev'd on other grounds 456 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1972).
54. See, e.g., Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9, 12-13 (D. Ore. 1975); Bone v.
Hibernia Bank, 493 F.2d 135,139 (9th Cir. 1974); Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499
F.2d 971, 976-77 (5th Cir. 1974).
55. 493 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1974).
56. Id. at 139.
57. 411 U.S. 356 (1973); see also note 19 supra.
58. 493 F.2d at 140.
59. Id. at 139.
60. 413 F. Supp. 587 (D. Haw. 1976); contra Pedro v. Pacific Plan, 393 F. Supp. 315, 323
(N.D. Cal. 1975). Both are district courts within the Ninth Circuit.
61. 413 F. Supp. at 591-92.
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problems the FRB faces in shouldering its administrative responsi-
bilities, the court noted "staff opinion letters are clearly the only
manageable vehicle by which the Board may respond to the mass
of inquiries from creditors or prospective creditors regarding com-
pliance with the Act's rules, regulations, and interpretations.""2
Thus, the Ninth Circuit squarely supports FRB promulgations
whether official or otherwise.
The Third Circuit also accepts the validity of staff opinion letters.
In Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc.,13 plaintiff alleged
that defendant failed to set forth the acceleration provisions in a
retail installment contract for the purchase of a new car. However,
a staff opinion letter and a FRB interpretation each indicated such
disclosure was not necessary."4 The court agreed, stating FRB inter-
pretations "are entitled to great weight," while staff opinions "are
to be considered the opinion of the Board" until a formal proclama-
tion supercedes them."5 The positions of the Ninth and Third Cir-
cuits are bold since Congress clearly suggested the 1974 "good faith
reliance" amendment did not include staff letters within its pur-
view."
The Second Circuit disputes the authority of staff letters. In
Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. 7 defendant produced
a staff letter which concluded that disclosure of an "open credit
plan" was unnecessary." The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York refused to give this correspondence
effect.6 9
Since the district court decided Ratner prior to Mourning and
before the 1974 "good faith reliance" amendment, its relevance
might have been suspect. However, the Second Circuit ratified
Ratner's rationale in Ives v. W. T. Grant Co.76 which was decided
62. Id. at 591.
63. 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975).
64. Id. at 267.
65. Id. & n.23. See Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
67. 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
68. Id. at 278.
69. One writer has theorized that the court refused to give this corrrespondence effect
because it was ex post facto. Garwood, A Look at Truth in Lending-Five Years After, 14
SANTA CLARA LAWYER 491, 494 n.18 (1973-74).
70. 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975).
[Vol. V
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after both Mourning and the 1974 amendment. In discussing the
effect of the '"good faith reliance" clause upon staff letters and pam-
phlets, the court found these authorities legally insufficient as a
defense because "the reference in subsection (f) to 'any rule, regula-
tion, or interpretation thereof by the Board' means those require-
ments of Truth in Lending that have become part of Regulation
Z."
7 1
The Second Circuit is a jurisdiction which geographically encom-
passes the commercial center of the world. Its creditors need to have
readily available information concerning the Act in order to func-
tion within the law. Pamphlets and staff letters are convenient
sources. Nevertheless, Ives expressly refused to give either of these
legal effect. It construed the 1974 amendment to mean that only
specific interpretations appended to Regulation Z were substan-
tively binding. Such an approach has not eased the plight of credi-
tors and is less desirable than that taken by the Ninth and Third
Circuits .7
The present law of the Fifth Circuit is unclear, although in the
past it decided the issue of FRB staff letter reliability in a fashion
similar to the Ninth Circuit. In Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet,
Inc., 7 the court gave FRB interpretations and staff opinions "great
weight, for they constitute part of the body of 'informed experience
and judgment of the agency to whom Congress delegated appropri-
ate authority'. ' 7 Recent decisions within the Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, do not reflect this deference.
In Willis v. Town Finance Corp.,75 defendant failed to disclose a
security interest which would vest in all properties acquired within
ten days of the loan.76 A staff clarification letter had determined
that such disclosure was unnecessary. Departing from the Philbeck
71. Id. at 758.
72. Nonetheless Ives is technically correct. Mourning never expressly required the courts
to honor FRB staff letters as substantive law. Rather it specifically upheld the right of the
FRB to issue reasonable regulations in administration of the Act. 411 U.S. at 369. Moreover,
Congress did expressly exclude staff letters from the ambit of the 1974 "good faith reli-
ance" amendment. See note 50 supra and accompanying text. Thus Ives is sound, but
query: Is it desirable?
73. 499 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1974).
74. Id. at 976 quoting Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 372
(1973).
75. 416 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
76. Id. at 11.
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precedent, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia held contrary to the letter." It noted "[t]he
Philbech rationale would seem to mandate that this Court simply
reverse the precedent in this district [lower court decisions] and
follow the January 5, 1975 F.R.B. staff 'clarification' Opinion Letter
• . . This Court leans more toward the restricted view of staff opin-
ion letters as expressed by Ives v. W. T. Grant."7
Willis could be restricted to its facts because Judge Moye might
have allowed his adverse perception of congressional lobbying to
cloud his reasoning.79 However, this distinction would not explain
Pollock v. General Finance Corp.,80 wherein the Fifth Circuit, on
similar facts, affirmed the "after acquired property" rule of Willis."1
A recent Fifth Circuit decision, Martin v. Commercial Securities
Co., 2 does more than imply a lack of faith in staff letters. The
Martin court refused to give effect to the interpretation contained
in one such letter "in the absence of a Regulation requiring it." 81
Although the court purported to comply with the Philbeck rule
that a staff letter must be afforded "substantial weight,""4 it attrib-
uted very little authority to the letter.
The Fifth Circuit has also demonstrated an aversion for What
You Ought to Know A bout Truth in Lending. In Pennino v. Morris
Kirschman & Co.,85 the court based its decision upon the intent of
77. Id. at 12-13.
78. Id. at 12.
79. Judge Moye alleged that industry representatives "instigated" opinion and clarifica-
tion letters which were favorable to their interests. He refused to follow the interpretations
of a single FRB employee subjected to this "lobbying" process. Id. at 13.
80. 535 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1976).
81. Id. at 299.
82. 539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976). This case involved the disclosure of an acceleration clause
in a combination promissory note-chattel mortgage finance arrangement. The disclosure
statement appeared on the front of the document. On the reverse side, where the borrower
signed his name, the lender had an additional disclosure statement which mentioned the
acceleration clause. Id.
83. Id. at 529. The court noted that 'lit is highly illuminating that there is no reference
in the Act, the Regulations, or the Official Interpretations of the Federal Reserve Board to
acceleration clauses or the right to accelerate payments, even though they are a common
feature of installment notes and are traditional creditors' remedies." Id. at 524. Thus the Fifth
Circuit apparently only permits "good faith" reliance upon FRB regulations under the 1974
amendment. See McGowan v. Credit Center, Inc., 546 F.2d 73, 76-77 (5th Cir. 1977); Jones
v. Community Loan & Inv. Corp., 544 F.2d 1228, 1229 (5th Cir. 1976).
84. Id. at 529.
85. 526 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1976).
NOTES
Congress in enacting the 1974 "good faith reliance" amendment."
It refused to recognize the legitimacy of anything but a formal FRB
proclamation.
Until recently, the Fifth Circuit had concurred with the Ninth in
giving legal effect to all FRB pronouncements. Now, for consistency,
it seemingly heeds Philbeck, and affords FRB staff letters
"substantial weight," 7 but only if they conform to the court's inter-
pretation of the Act. In effect, both the Fifth Circuit and the Second
refuse to consider staff letters authoritative.8
The Seventh Circuit has not squarely addressed the issue of FRB
authority. In Allen v. Beneficial Finance Co., 9 the co-maker of a
note filed a complaint against the lender for allegedly failing to
disclose the finance terms in a "meaningful sequence," as required
by Regulation Z.1" The Seventh Circuit found Mourning dispositive,
holding that the FRB could promulgate a regulation concerning a
financing arrangement not covered in the Act." But the court ad-
hered to the definition of a "meaningful sequence" which a staff
letter had proposed. 2 Perhaps the Seventh Circuit now recognizes
the validity of such correspondence.
However, the Tenth Circuit's view is quite clear. In Begay v.
Ziems Motor Co.,"3 plaintiff alleged that defendant truck seller did
not meaningfully disclose the existence of an acceleration clause in
the financing agreement. 4 Despite the existence of a FRB staff opin-
ion letter which favored plaintiff's position, the Tenth Circuit re-
fused to follow it concluding that "the letter [was not] such a
construction or interpretation as to constitute an official interpreta-
tion, and it represent[ed] no more than the Director's view."95
This conflict among the circuits is a serious one because creditors
86. Id. at 371 n.8.
87. 539 F.2d at 529.
88. The Fifth Circuit has recently affirmed the Martin rationale in McDaniel v. Fulton
Nat'l Bank, 543 F.2d 568, 569 (5th Cir. 1976). These views seem inconsistent with those of a
court which once sympathized with a creditor who was guilty of merely "technical
violationis] of the Truth-in-Lending Act." Stefanski v. Midway Budget Plan, Inc., 456 F.2d
211, 213 (5th Cir. 1972). What could be more technical than noncompliance with the Act
because of misplaced reliance upon a FRB staff letter which is later deemed invalid by the
court?
89. 531 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3275 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1976)(No.
76-182).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 800.
92. Id. at 801.
93. No. 75-1694 (10th Cir., Feb. 28, 1977).
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id. at 12. The court of appeals adopted the Fifth Circuit's rationale in Martin. Id. at
10-12. See notes 82-84 supra and accompanying text.
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have to rely upon the FRB for guidance in order to comply with the
law. If the courts refuse to give legal effect to letters or pamphlets,
the creditor might have to pay penalties in spite of his good faith
reliance." In the Second, Fifth and Tenth Circuits, the creditor can
only depend upon FRB interpretations; in the Ninth and Third
Circuits, one might follow staff letters with impunity; in the Sev-
enth Circuit the creditor must surmise the applicable law.
D. A Moot Controversy?
The 94th Congress may have finally resolved the conflict. Busi-
nessmen, who were tired of being senselessly penalized for their
attempts to comply with the law, suggested to the Subcommittee
on Consumer Affairs of the House Banking, Currency and Housing
Committee that at least staff letters should carry substantive
weight. 7 Ideally they desired a credit form review system, whereby
prospective creditors could merely submit proposed credit applica-
tions to the staff, and upon approval, use the applications without
fear of suit." Congress heeded their complaints and, on February 27,
1976 amended the 1974 "good faith reliance" provision to legitimate
any "interpretation or approval by an official or employee of the
Federal Reserve System duly authorized by the Board to issue such
interpretations or approvals under such procedures as the Board
may prescribe therefor."''
96. See note 44 supra.
97. CONSUMER INFORMATION 143-53. The Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the
House Banking, Currency and Housing Committee held hearings on April 15, 1975. As a
result of these hearings, a general feeling prevailed that something would be done to ease the
plight of creditors. See, e.g., the exchange between Sheldon I. London of the National Home
Furnishing Association and Representative Wylie:
Mr. Wylie. We tried to address ourselves to this problem, as you know, in the last
Congress. As a matter of fact, a good faith compliance provision was put in the bill
(1974 Amendment). ...
Apparently what you are saying is that it is not quite enough.
Mr. London. Precisely, sir.
Mr. Wylie. And what you are suggesting is something along the lines of the OSHA
type arrangement where an advisory opinion can be asked for in advance, and if an
advisory opinion is given and the person follows that advisory opnion [sic], then he
has, in effect, exercised good faith compliance.
Mr. London. Yes.
Id. at 153.
98. Id. at 142.
99. Act of February 27, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3(b), 90 Stat. 197 (to be codified in
15 U.S.C. § 1640(f)). This amendment provides:
[Vol. V
NOTES
The floor debates in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate reflect congressional concern for the hapless creditor who
suffered penalties for his compliance. Representative Annunzio de-
plored the anomalous situation where businessmen had to "wait
until they [were] sued" in order to get an accurate statement of the
law.' 00 He also pointed out that the amendment "is only permissive
and does not force the Federal Reserve Board to designate staff
members who can hand down advisory opinions unless the Board so
chooses."'' Senators Garn and Proxmire urged support of the
amendment, indicating that any such interpretation or approval
would have "binding effect."'' 2 These comments demonstrate two
congressional purposes. First, Congress wished to grant the FRB
sufficient discretion to administer the Act. Thus only the FRB could
provide the "procedures"' 03 for procuring truth-in-lending informa-
tion. Second, Congress wanted to enact an exculpatory provision. It
did so by providing a defense to truth-in-lending violations based
upon good faith reliance, similar to that which defendant proposed
in Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.'04
The 1976 amendment was designed to vest discretion with the
FRB. Conceivably, the Board could have seized the opportunity
to legitimate its pamphlets and seminars, as well as its staff letters
under the "approvals" or "procedures" phrases of the amendment.
No provision of this section or section 112 imposing any liability shall apply to any
act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule, regulation, or interpreta-
tion thereof by the Board or in conformity with any interpretation or approval by an
official or employee of the Federal Reserve System duly authorized by the Board to
issue such interpretations or approvals under such procedures as the Board may pre-
scribe therefor, notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such rule,
regulation, interpretation, or approval is amended, rescinded, or determined by judi-
cial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.
100. 122 CONG. REC. H816 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1976).
101. Id.
102. 122 CONG. REC. S1548 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1976) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
Senator Proxmire:
In addition the House amendment would authorize the Federal Reserve Board
to delegate to its staff the authority to issue interpretations or approvals that
would have binding effect in subsequent litigation over violations of the Truth
in Lending Act. That is, compliance with such an interpretation would consti-
tute an absolute defense to a creditor until that interpretation was reversed by
higher authority.
Id. (emphasis added); see also the remarks of Senator Garn. Id. at 1547.
103. See note 99 supra.
104. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
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Congress probably would have permitted this in light of the concern
of the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs for businessmen's com-
plaints in this area. "'' The FRB, however, cautiously exercised this
discretion. It amended section 226 of Regulation Z on July 10, 1976,
but did not significantly increase its powers.'"'
The new regulations only allow immunity for reliance on "official
interpretations" and "official staff letters."' ' These are not liberally
issued. The FRB grants official interpretations upon request so long
as a "potentially controversial" issue "of general applicability" is
involved. 0" These are binding as substantive law. Secondly, the
staff dispatches its own official staff interpretations to clear up
"technical ambiguities" if "no significant policy implications"
exist.' "' The FRB also considers these legally operative. Lastly,
the staff send unofficial staff interpretations to the curious as a
service."" A creditor cannot rely upon these unofficial staff inter-
pretations to gain protection under the amended "good faith"
clause of the Act."' Moreover, the FRB has refused to initiate the
review system of creditors' forms which businessmen requested in
105. See notes 97-98 supra and accompanying text.
106. The amended regulation appears at 41 Fed. Reg. 28,255-56 (1976) (to be codified in
12 C.F.R. § 226.1). New section 226.1(d)(3) provides:
Designation of official to issue interpretations. Pursuant to section 130(f) of the Act
(section 1640(f) of this title], the Board has designated the Director and other officials
of the Office of Saver and Consumer Affairs as officials "duly authorized" to issue, at
their discretion, official staff interpretations of this Part. This designation shall not be
interpreted to include authority to approve particular creditors' forms in any manner.
New section 226.1(d)(4) provides:
The type of interpretation issued will be determined by the Board and the designated
officials by the following criteria:
(i) Official Board interpretations will be issued upon those requests which
involve potentially controversial issues of general applicability dealing with sub-
stantial ambiguities in this Part and which raise significant policy questions.
(ii) Official staff interpretations will be issued upon those requests which, in
the opinion of the designated officials, require clarification of technical ambigui-
ties in this Part or which have no significant policy implications.
(iii) Unofficial staff interpretations will be issued where the protection of Sec-
tion 130(f) of the Act Isection 1640(f) of this title] is neither requested nor
required, or where time strictures require a rapid response.
107. 41 Fed. Reg. 28,256 (1976) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1(d)(4)(i)-(ii)).
108. Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(4)(i)).
109. Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(4)(ii)).
110. Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(4)(iii)).
111. See note 99 supra.
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the House hearings.' 2 Given the seemingly boundless grant of ad-
ministrative power to the FRB through the 1976 amendment, these
changes in Regulation Z are an exercise in restraint.
The legal effect of pamphlets, leaflets and the various FRB educa-
tive programs remains doubtful because the FRB has ignored an
opportunity to legitimate all of its pronouncements. It has only
protected interpretations and official staff letters. Under present
law, the inquirer must make his intentions clear to the FRB. If he
expresses a desire for immunity and grave policy implications are
involved, the FRB will issue an official interpretation."' If immun-
ity is desired and only technical ambiguities are involved, the staff
will send an official staff interpretation."4 But if the inquirer does
not indicate his desire for exculpation, the staff will send him an
unofficial staff interpretation which, if relied upon, affords no pro-
tection."15
IV. Conclusion
The scope of FRB authority has been a source of contention since
Congress delegated it responsibility to administer the Act."' Never-
theless, it has emerged as the legitimate overseer. Congress wanted
an agency with the necessary expertise to unify all credit regula-
tions. The United States Supreme Court agreed. These supportive
forces defined FRB authority.
In its first five years as administrator of the Act, the FRB's role
progressed from that of regulator to that of legislator as well. This
occurred when the United States Supreme Court allowed the FRB
112. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
113. Any request for formal FRB interpretations or official staff interpretations of Regula-
tion Z must be addressed to the Director of the Office of Saver and Consumer Affairs, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C. 20551. 41 Fed. Reg. 28,255
(1976) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(1)).
114. Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(4)(ii)).
115. Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(4)(iii)).
116. Indeed reformers are still attempting to limit the FRB's powers. See, e.g., A Bill to
Promote the Independence and Responsibility of the Federal Reserve System: Hearings on
H.R. 12934 Before the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (1976). Kathleen F. O'Reilly, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America, sug-
gests that the FRB could be more accountable to Congress if it were required to submit reports
on its enforcement activities. Id. Congress might then be in a more favorable position to judge
whether "the Federal Reserve is properly and persistently carrying out its obligation to
protect consumers." Id.
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to supplement the Act through Regulation Z. Then Congress en-
acted the 1974 amendment which permitted the FRB to supplement
Regulation Z with interpretations. Finally, the 1976 amendment has
validated "official" staff letters, and has probably resolved some of
the conflict among the circuits."7 Should the trend continue, pam-
phlets, leaflets and training sessions will also bind as law, enabling
the FRB to educate the public about the Act without senselessly
subjecting anyone to liability.
Michael Thomas Kelly
117. It is possible that the Second Circuit could adhere to its previous reasoning expressed
in Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975). In that case the court refused to
recognize as valid anything not a part of Regulation Z. The new regulation has not incorpo-
rated these staff letters into Regulation Z. Therefore, conceivably, the Second Circuit could
continue to protest their validity. This is unlikely, however, because the new regulation
specifically includes official staff correspondence within the purview of the "good faith reli-
ance" clause.
